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The International Criminal Court and the U.S. War on
Terrorism: Does It H elp or Hinder?
Alan R. Lewist

Although the International c~·iminal Court initially appears to be a potential
step forward in the war on tnrurism, it wiLl more cn'tainly be a setback in
terms of American sove~·eignty and constitutionally guaranued civil
liberties and rights.

dmirredly, rhe i nternational community struggles with producing an adequate legal response ro terrorism. The world's
mixed critique of America's campaign in Afghanistan reveals the
lack of an internationally accepted approach to apprehending and
prosecu ting terrorists. Such inconsistencies between stares have allowed terrorists to successfully avoid prosecution and given the international com munity an incentive to create a global approach to
the war on terrorism.
T h e recently created International Criminal Court (ICC) appears to resolve, at least in part, this terrorist dilemma. David
Scheffler, head of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations negotiations on the ICC, has stated that "the terrorist assaults of September u, 2001 on the United States were crimes against humanity
that probably would have fallen within the jurisdiction of the ICC
had the Courr existed on that date."• Although the ICC initially appears to be a potential step forward in the war on terrorism, it will
more certainly be a setback in terms of American sovereignty and
constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties and rights. The trade-off
is unacceptable.

A

1 Alan R. Lewis gradu~~d in d1~ spring of 1002 with a degree in American studies. He will
srudying inrernationallaw at Columbia L"lw School this f.Ul. Though a narive of Chicago,
he is currendy working as a marketing consul ram in Thousand Oaks, California.
1
David J. Scheffler, "Sraying d1e Course with the Inrernarional C riminal Court, .. Co1·n~il
Inurnatumai Law ]ournaiJ5 (:z.oOI): 47·
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AMERICA's SoLUTION TO TERRORISM?

While the debate over U.S. involvement in the ICC is anything but settled, a new line of criticism has arisen. American proponents of the ICC assert that "the Bush Administration dealt a
sharp blow to its own war on terrorism ... in rej ecting the ICC."z
However, critics also realize that the ICC offers legitimate advantages to any nation seeking to apprehend and prosecute terrorists.
These advantages begin with the ICC's promise to surmount
the deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals, since "as a permanent entity its
very existence will be a deterrent, sending a strong warning mes-:
sage to would-be perpetrators. " 3 Furthermore, a permanent court
should be able to apply an undeviating, uniform standard of justice, binding on all nations, regardless of political disagreements}
The case for the ICC is fun her strengthened as the U.S. has
recently flagged terrorism as one of the nation's gravest threats.
Former U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated: "President Clinton has rightly identified terrorism as on e of the most
important security challenges [America faces] in the wake of the
Cold War." 5 As scholars increasingly assert that international terrorism can be effectively combated only through a globally unified
effort, U.S. objections can easily be misinterpreted as petty. 6 However, the war on terrorism will never become more important than
the unavoidable constitutional and U.S . policy conflicts that the
ICC engenders. Regrettably, the ICC not only fails to explicitly
guarantee a substantial list of constitutional rights, but it also

' Ibid.
' United Nations, "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Questions
and Answers," <www.un.orgllaw/icc/stanare/iccq&a.htm>, u November 2002.
• Steven W. Krohne, "The United States and the World Need an International Criminal
Courr as an Ally in the War against Terrorism," Indiana International and Comparative Law

Review 8 (1997): 159·
' Warren Christopher, wFighcing Terrorism: Challenges for PeaccrnaketS," Address tO
the Washington lnscitute for Near East Policy Annual Soref Symposium, 21 May 1996,
<WWW.usia.gov/topics/terror/suspeech.htm>, 12 October 1996, quoted in Krohne, x6o.
• Krohne, 160.
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creates new legal dilemmas regarding the issues of jurisdiction, legal
vagueness, and a usurpation of UN Security Council prerogative.
ICC

HISTORY

The International Criminal Court (ICC) became the world's
first permanent international court on 1 July 2001 , after its charter
was ratified by the required sixty nations .' However, the vision of an
international court was first conceived after the creation of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals and resurged when the UN conducted two temporary international tribunals to prosecute individuals from Yugoslavia and Rwanda for war crimes. The logistical difficulties of these ad hoc trials worked to increase global pressure for
a permanent court, resulting in the International Law Commission
submitting an ICC d raft statute to the UN General Assembly in
1994· Final changes were made to the draft during the Rome Conference chat concluded 17 July 1998. 8
Citing the need to remain an influential party in the creation of
the ICC, the United States- under the Clinton Administrationbecame a signarory parry to the Rome Srarue on 31 December 2000. ~
In 2002 the U.S. Senate rejected an attempt to ratify the statute
after the Bush Administration raised strong objections.
So long as the Bush Administration remains hostile to U.S. participation in the ICC, American law will remain unaffected by the
extreme impact that such participation would deliver. As the war on
terrorism increasingly buttresses the compelling case for the ICC, it
is terrorism that may ultimately be to blame for the unacceptable
consequences that the U.S. legal system would endure if the nation
were ever to become a party to the court.
• David M. Baranoff, "Unbalance of Powers: The lmernational Criminal Court's Potential

Upset the Founder's Checks and Balances, n Univ=ity ofPmnsylvania jourMI o.(Constimtional Larv 4 (2.002.): Soo.
• G:uy T. Dempsey, "Reasonable Doubt: The Case against the Proposed Imernational

to

Criminal Coun,n Cato Policy Analysis No. 30, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/fomt!
academids_guidednews.html>, 18 December 2.002, 2.
' Scheffler, 48.
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PoLicY PRoBLEMs

One of the predominant concerns with the- ICC statute is the
Court's potential for interfering wi th state affai;s by infringing on
an individual nation's sovereignty. The Court's answer to this fear is
the doctrine of "complementarity. " The Courr is to complement the
existing judicial system of any given nation, intervening only when
a "state is unwilling or genuinely unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution. " 10 The ICC itself must arbitrarily determine
unwillingness by judging whether a nation has unfairly shielded the
accused, exercised unjustified delay, or if the nation's judicial proceedings have not been "conducted independently or impartially. " 11
Thus the doctrine of complementarity-though meant to dispel
worries of a runaway court-"is an open invitation for the court to
examine each decision by the United States not to pursue some alleged offense by its military or civilian officials. " 1z Allowing the
ICC to determine if any judicial proceeding meers its own ambiguous standard of impartiality grants the court "the power to override
the U .S. legal system and pass judgment on our foreign policy action." 13 Recognizing the ICC's jurisdiction would thus require the
unacceptable compromise of U.S. sovereignty w ithin our own judicial system through "the erection of an international authority with
substantive power over individual Americans in general . . . represents a profound surrender of American sovereignty-the right to
self-government." 14

•• Imemarional Criminal Coun Starure, an. 17, <www.un.org/icc.htm>, 18 November 2002..
" Ibid.
" lee A. C15eY and David B. Rivkin, Prepared Starmenr of I..« A. Casey and David B. Rivkin
Before the Senate Foreign Relarions Conunittee, Fed~ra/ News Servic~, 2.3 July 1998,
<Imp://web.lexis-nexis.com/wliverse/form/academids_guidednews.hrml>, 18 December 2.002, 4
" Diane M. Amann and M. N. Sellers, "American Law in a Tune of Global Interdependence: U.S. National Reports to the XVlth Imemarional Congress of Comparative law,"
American journal ofComparative lAw 50 (Fall 2.002): 381, quoting Senaror Rod Grams, Hearing on the International Criminal Court for the Imernarional Operations Subcommittee of
the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 23 July 1998.
"Casey and Rivkin, 5·
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Another danger of the ICC is its inherent lack of accountability. In the United States, two other powerful branches of government check the Supreme Court. All of the Supreme Court's decisions can be overridden through amendment by legislators elected
by American citizens. No such system of checks and balances exists
within or around the ICC. Furthermore, "no action taken by the
American people, or their elected representatives, could alter in
any way a decision of the ICC." U.S. interests would simply be
marginalized as one among dozens of nations and "viewed with suspicion by many states, and with outright hostility by more than a
l:
rew. "15
The ICC also threatens to circumvent and override the established preeminent role of the UN Security Council. The Charter of
the United Nations " imposes obligations that 'shall prevail ' over
those under any other international agreement." 11' The Charter also
created the UN Security Council upon which the U.S. sits as one of
five permanent members whose veto can quickly halt Security Council action. The Council is charged with determining "the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
shall . . . decide what measures shall be taken. " ICC opponents
argue t h at "all matters of interest to the ICC fall within the jurisdiction of the Security Council; therefore, the Council would have
prior review before a matter is referred to a judicial process" such
as the ICC. By granting itself jurisdiction over matters that already
fall under the purview of the Security Council, the ICC threatens
to deny the permanent Council members of their right to veto,
thereby treading on the Council's domain in some cases and bypassing the Council in all of them. 17
The ICC also has great potential for "jurisdictional creep." 18
Many advocates of the court have already tried to expand the ICC's
purview to issues of human rights violations, drug trafficking, and
•; Casey and Rivkin, 5·
Amann, 383, referring co UN Charter, an. 103.
" Ibid., quoting UN Ch:aner, art. 39·
" Dempsey, r.
16
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environmental infracrions.t9 Nevertheless, the immediate potencial
for jurisdictional creep is found in the vague and stretchable language of the ICC's statute.
In the text of the Rome Statute, rhe ICC is given jurisdiction over
four areas of offence: "the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes and the crime of aggression." 20 The definitions of all four
offences are replete with ambiguities and sweeping language chat potentially allows for ICC judges and prosecutors to engage in a jurisdictional free-for-all. :a
Article Six of the ICC statute identifies one definition of genocide
as "causing serious bodily or memal harm to members of [a] group."1z
Article Seven defines crimes against humanity as "intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health," and persecution in the form of "any deprivation of fundamental rights."z3 Article Eight includes as part of the war crimes definition, "committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatmenr."l<l The potential for dispute over
this definitional language is daunting as the world has yet to agree
upon the precise meanings of personal dignity, degrading treatment,
fundamental rights, and what constitutes serious mental harm.
Defining the crime of aggression was such a controvertial topic at
rhe Rome Conference chat signatory parties, many of whom fear the
sweeping potential of this category in particular, placed the issue on
hold. Current proposals for defining aggression have thus far included
blockading ports by armed forces-such as chat employed by President Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis-and confiscation of property.1s This wording would "have direct implications for the United
States, which continues to freeze Libyan assers."16
" Ibid., 4,. International Criminal Courr St:t.ture, art. S·
" Willcins, J·
~ International Criminal Coun Statute, art. 6 .
..., Ibid., art. 7·
'• ibid., an. 8.
's ~ UN: Ddegarcs Differ on Whether St:t.rure of Imernational Criminal Coun Should
Cover Crime of Agrcssion," M2 Presswirr, 24 October 1997, quored in Dempsey, 5·
'"Dempsey, 5·
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CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNFLICTS

In 1998 Lee A. Casey and David B. Rivkin presented a prepared
statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, outlining major constirurional objections to U.S. involvement with the
ICC on the grounds that "Americans brought before this cou rr
would nor enjoy the basic guarantees of rhe Bill of Rights. " 1- Their
argument called for outright rejection of U.S. participation in or
sanction of any judicial body bereft of explicit constitutional principles familiar to Americans. ICC proponents counter that such
rights are implicitly inferred in the stature. 18 However, trusting textual inference would force the U.S. to accept on good faith that the
ICC will hold itself ro a higher standard than the Founders were
willing to trust our own government to do, since they saw fit to explicitly outline the rights of the accused in an effort to protect U.S.
citizens from abuses of power. Such good faith is unwise and unwarranted, as the panel of ICC judges will largely be comprised of
judges from cou ntries that recognize no such guarantees-countries
like Cambodia, Afghanistan, Mongolia, and Tajikistan.
A second constitution al objection is raised against rhe possibility of the U.S. conceding any degree of judicial authority whatsoever as "rhe judicial power of rhe United Scares is vested in the
Supreme Court, and in lower federal courts as may be established by
Congress. " 29 In the case of Ex parte Milligan, the Supreme Court clarified that only a U .S. court can exercise this power. This decision
held that "every trial involves the exercise of judicial power," and
the military tribunal that tried Milligan , a U.S. citizen, therefore
could nor legally assume any degree of power from the U.S. judicial
sysrem.'0
In Reid v. Covert, Justice Hugo L. Black affirmed that "the
United Stares is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Irs power
2' Casey :tnd Rivkin, I.
,. Baranoff. 803.
,. Casey and Rivkin, I.
,. Ex part~ Milligan, 7I U.S. (4 Wall.)

2

(I866), quoted in Casey,

2.

22

BruGHAM YoUNG UNIVERSITY PRELAW REviEW

[Vol. 17

and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance
with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution. "31 On another
occasion, the Supreme Court similarly remarked that "it would not
be contended that [the treaty power of th e U.S. government] extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids."H
Furthermore, constitutional rights beginning with "the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury" are conspicuously
absent from the Rome Statute.H Not only will a panel of judgesthe majority of whom will not be American and could thus harbor
bias against American defendants-decide cases in the ICC, but
also UN judicial proceedings in the past have subscribed to a different definition of what constitutes a speedy trial. While a defendant in the U .S. has a right to be brought to trial within seventy
days, the UN Yugoslav Tribunal Prosecutor has argu ed "that up to
five years would not be too long to wait in prison for a trial.".l4
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution also guarantees that
all trials take place in the state and district where the crim e occurred.3~ Justice Joseph Story explains, "The object of this clause is
to secure the accused party from being dragged to a trial in some
distant state, away from his friends, and witnesses, and neighborhood; and thus subjected to the mere verdict of strangers, who may
feel no common sympathy, or who even cherish animosities, or prejudices against him." 36 The ICC would fail to offer such a guarantee
while trying U.S. citizens, miles from their homeland, in a courtroom of foreign citizens.
The Sixth Amendment also provides that an accused person
has the right "to be confronted with the wimesses against hi m. " 37
The Yugoslav Tribunal, 38 an accepted model for the ICC, adopted
) I

Reid v. Covn·t, 354 u.s .. s- 6, quoted in Casey and Rivkin,

2.

'" Casey and Rivkin, 8, citing D~ George v. Riggs. 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
" U.S. Consrirurion, amend. 6.
Jo Casey and Rivkin, J, quoting Prosecution R.esponse ro the Defence Motion for Provisional Release J.2.5·• ICTY Case No. IT-95·14II-PT, 14 January 1998.
·" Ibid., referring to U.S. Consrirution, amend. 6.
"" Ibid., quoting Jusrice Joseph Srory, Commmtarits on tbt ConJtimtion, 658.
Constitution, amend. 6.
... Casey and Rivkin, 3·

r u.s.
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a provision known as Rule 75, which indicates that the court can
"order appropriate measures for the privacy and protection of victims and witnesses," allowing some witnesses to remain anonymous
to the defendants and their lawyers.J9 "When witnesses are granted
anonymity ... [and] cannot be cross-examined or charged with perjury," the consequences of a lie will be 'particularly grave in proceedings [like those of the Yugoslavia tribunal] where verbal testimony rather than material proof is the basis for conviction.'"40
Another concern is the ICC's potential for circumventing the
Fifth Amendment right prohibiting double jeopardy. If the ICC
"gets to invalidate national trials by deciding what constirutes an
'effective' or ' ineffective' trial, the international court will exercise
a type of judicial review power over national criminal justice systems,"•• thereby potentially subjecting an individual acquitted by a
U.S. court to a second trial. 41
Finally, the ICC statute does not incorporate the constitutional
protection against excessive bail, nor does it "exclude 'hearsay' evidence that does not fall within a recognized exception to the general role." The Yugoslav Tribunal, after which the ICC is partially
modeled, allowed for "both anonymous witnesses and extensive
hearsay evidence. " 4'
CoNCLUSION: HINDRANCE DESPITE THE HELP

Terrorism-marked by its unpredictable barbarism-creates fear in
its potential victims. This fear in turn breeds the desperation which allows
for the compromise of once nonnegotiable principles. This is exactly why
U.S. proponents of the ICC find themselves willing to surrender national
sovereignty to a court accountable to no one, with a charter that fails to
"'James Podgers, "The Wodd C ries for Jusrice,M ABA journal, April 1996, 58, quoted in
Dempsey, 11.
40
Diana Johnstone, "Sdective Justice in The Hague," The Nation, 22 September 1997, 19,
quoted in Dempsey, 11.

•• Dempsey, 3·
" Amann, 387.
"-' Casey and Rivkin, 3·
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guarantee many of our constitutionally explicit safeguards. The ICC fails
co provide guarantees against the undesirable possibilities of double jeopardy, excessive bail, permitting hearsay evidence, and deliberately drawnour trials. Acknowledging ICC jurisdiction would grant the Court judicial powers that the Constitution forbids.
Even the text of the ICC Charter is legally defective, plagued by
vague language that allows for jurisdictional creep and assumption of unexpressed powers. Undoubtedly, the ICC offers legitimate assistance to
the international war on terror. However, apparent progress in the war on
terrorism will yield no true progress if it also requires a retreat in the name
of freedom, civil rights, and self-government for the U.S. Joining the ICC
for the seductive purpose of prosecuting terrorists would simultaneously
allow terrorism to cake an unacceptable roll on American law and founding principles. Thus the ICC can be seen only as a hindrance to U.S. interests regardless of the little help it may represent.

